ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

"Countries with close international trade links would benefit from a common currency and are more likely to be members of an optimum currency area (OCA). Thus the nature and extent of international trade is one criterium for EMU entry, or, more generally, membership in an OCA."
s emphasized in literature at least since [9] , a main advantage of joining a OCA is the reduction of transaction costs of trade (see also [1] ). Countries that trade more with each other are more likely to constitute a currency union. The greater is the level of trade the higher are the savings in conversion costs and risks associated with different currencies.
Frankel, J. A. and Rose, A. [6] claimed that trade intensity and other OCA criteria, such as business cycles correlation, are jointly endogenuous. They empirically show that there is a positive correlation between bilateral trade and cross country correlation of business cycle activity. In analyzing the determinants of currency unions, [16] investigated the role of geography, cultural similarity, size, political integration, colonial origins, and synchronization of economic shocks. She does not take into account, however, for bilateral trade and other possible economic determinants of monetary unions such as GDP and per capita income. [4] estimated the probability that a "client" country adopts the currency of a main "anchor" country and used this likelihood as an instrument for currency areas in the "gravity" equation model. In their work, [1] find that both past inflation and economic shocks correlation are crucial for OCA membership. A country is more willing to give up its own money the higher is the inflation rate it experienced in the past and the greater is the business cycle correlation with the anchor.
Several studies since the seminal work of [11] (see also [5] , [7] , [12] ) have investigated the effect of currency unions on trade. Almost always, these studies use a simple OLS methodology to estimate the effect of currency union on trade. OLS estimate, however, is biased if unmeasured characteristics, such as compatibility of legal and political system, cultural links, institution quality and total bilateral transfers can affect the propensity to adopt a common currency as well as increase bilateral trade between countries. In addition, countries that share a common currency might promote policies that foster integration and facilitate trade.
Both these unmeasured characteristics and the self-selection problem between trade and currency unions are clear cut signs that endogeneity may be present. [14] support this view. Using a panel data set spanning from 1920s to 1930s, they find that trade among future currency area member states was already high in 1920s, and that trade patterns in 1920s are good predictors of monetary union membership in 1930s.
What are the determinants of monetary unions? This paper seeks to address this question using a IV methodology. Geography, colonial heritage, language, cultural and political similarities, and bilateral trade between countries are investigated as determinants of monetary unions. The reduced form equation of trade is estimated using The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the content of the dataset. Section 3 discusses both the currency union model and the econometric methodology. The empirical results are discussed in section 4. The summary ends the paper.
A LOOK AT THE DATASET
The [7] 's dataset has been exploited to study the determinants of currency unions within a cross-sectional fashion. The analysis is performed on ten multiple of 5-year subsamples (between 1950 and 1996) extracted from the original dataset. The variables of interest are described below.
ltrade ijt is a continuous variable which measures the (log) average value of real bilateral trade between country i and country j in year t; lrgdp it is a continuous variable denoting the (log) real GDP of country i in year t; lrgdppc it is a continuous variable denoting the (log) real per-capita GDP of country i in year t; ldist ij is a continuous variable which denotes the (log) great-circle distance between the capitals of country i and country j; comlang ij is a binary variable indicating whether country i and country j have a common language; border ij is a binary variable which measures whether nation i and nation j share a border (either by land or sovereign waters, as recognized by international low); regional ijt is a binary variable that indicates whether country i and country j belong to the same regional trade agreement at time t; landl ij is a dichotomous variable indicating the number of landlocked nations in the country-pair (0, 1 or 2); island ij is a dichotomous variable measuring the number of island nations between country i and country j (0, 1 and 2); larea i is a continuous variable denoting the (log) land surface of country i; comcol ij is a binary variable that measures whether country i and country j have ever been colonized (after 1945) by the same colonizer; curcol ijt is a binary variable indicating whether nation i and nation j are colonies in year t; colony ij is a binary variable that measures whether country i has ever been colonized by country j or vice versa; comnat ij is a binary variable that indicates whether country i and country j have remained part of the same nation during the sample period; custrict ijt is a binary variable that records whether nation i and nation j belong to the same currency union in year t.
A MODEL OF CURRENCY UNIONS
Endogeneity of OCA criteria can be a problem when assessing the role of trade intensity as a determinant of monetary union. As mentioned above, unmeasured characteristics such as compatibility of legal and political systems, cultural similarities, better institutions, and tied bilateral transfers can affect the propensity to adopt a common currency as well as increase bilateral trade between two countries. In addition, members of a currency area might promote policies that foster integration and facilitate trade. Another source of endogeneity is the reverse causality problem. Namely, large level of bilateral trade may be the consequence rather than the cause of monetary union membership. The elimination of conversion costs and risk associated to different currencies encourages bilateral transactions between member states. Bilateral trade between two countries may be high ex-post, even though the level of trade was very low ex-ante the adoption of a common currency.
Endogeneity in classical OLS and Probit models leads to inconsistent estimates. One way to consistently estimate the effect of trade on currency union is by using a Two Stage Probit methodology (see, among others, [8] and [17] for further details). The model can be written as follows
where Z 1 is the matrix of exogenous variables (such as geographic distance, size, common languages, colonial heritage) in the probit model (1). The (log) level of bilateral trade between countries i and j, ltrade ij , is the continuous endogenous variable and the disturbance term (u 1 , v 2 ) has a zero mean bivariate normal distribution and is independent of the matrix of all exogenous variables, Z. The greeks  and  are parameters. (1) and (3) are the structural equations one wishes to estimate while (2) is the reduced-form equation for (log) level of trade. Subscripts i and j are omitted thereafter for ease of exposition.
Before implementing the two step procedure, the [15] test for endogeneity is performed (an alternative test is provided by [10] ). Instruments of ltrade are needed to run the Smith-Blundell test and, eventually, the two step estimation. To identify them, the following standard procedure is followed. First, the reduced form expressions of both ltrade and custrict are estimated by OLS and probit, respectively. Second, those variables that enter significantly in the OLS equation, but not into the probit equation, are eligible instruments of ltrade.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Smith-Blundell procedure to test exogeneity of ltrade has been implemented for each subsample year, from 1950 to 1997. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of ltrade is rejected 47 times out of 48. Only in 1953 there is not enough evidence against the null (see Tables 1 and 2 ). This means that bilateral trade is possibly endogenous in (1), and two step methodology with instruments should be implemented to consistently estimate the endogenous variable coefficient. Quite surprisingly, the suitable instruments for ltrade are time dependents. In the first subsample period, between 1950 and 1970, economic indicators such as the per-capita income and the GDP better instrument bilateral trade. Since 1970, as these variables become more correlated with currency unions, the best eligible instruments for bilateral trade are represented by colonial links such as colony, curcol and comctry, as reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. To estimate the determinants of currency unions the two stage estimation methodology has been performed. First, the reduced form equation of (2) is estimated using the well known "gravity" equation model. The predicted values of ltrade from the first-stage regression are then used in the probit second-stage estimation. The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 .
The main finding of the paper is that IV estimates of bilateral trade are not statistically significant in (1) for each subsample under study (see Table 4 ). This means that bilateral trade between countries is not a useful predictor of their membership in a currency union. This is in contrast with the OCA theory which states that countries with closer bilateral trade links would benefit more from joining a currency union. Common colonial history and geographical characteristics of two countries are strong predictors of their propensity to join a currency union. The almost always negative coefficient of lrgdp means that smaller countries are more likely to form a currency union.
The negative sing of ldist means that geographically closer states are more prone to participate in currency unions. More subtle is the negative sign on the border variable. This is explained by the fact that most member countries are islands. Speaking the same language increases the chances for two states of belonging the same monetary union. The regional variable coefficient, where significant, is negative. As argued by [16] , to the extent that free trade agreements enhance trade between member states, more open countries have a lower incentive to produce surprise inflation and thus they are less prone to participate in currency unions as a commitment device.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the determinants of currency unions using a two step probit estimation methodology. It is shown that, geography, colonial heritage, language, cultural and political similarities are strong predictors of monetary unions. In contrast, bilateral trade is not statistically significant. This means that the bilateral exchanges of goods and services between two countries do not help to predict their membership in a common currency area. 
